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Writing As Reading in the Textual Tradition
By Jeremy Cohen
 “Very well, my dear fellow,” Socrates says to his 
interlocutor Phaedrus, “but you must first show me what it is 
that you have in your left hand under your cloak, for I surmise 
that it is  the actual discourse” (477). Very little could 
invalidate an argument more rapidly, in Plato’s terms, than 
reading it from paper. Centuries later, by the time Macrobius 
was personifying and fetishizing the worthy passage, an entire 
textual tradition of Greek and Latin had moved to the 
forefront of Hellenic and Roman culture. The ability to read – 
for authorial intent and concealed meaning alike – became 
vital. Plotinus  optimistically yearned for beautiful emanations 
of universal truth throughout the world. Informed by 
Christian theology and acosmistic love, Augustine aspired to 
the salvation of souls. Compared to these lofty aims, the 
endeavors  of Horace and Longinus – noble pagans both, 
direct heirs to the classical heritage – seem trivial. Effectively 
writing clever, self-fulfilling guides to composing good 
poetry and sublime oratory, their concern is in perfecting a 
craft (pragmatic ars and techne, respectively), yet the authors 
are far more playful and passionate than Aristotle in his 
detached treatises. For a poet and a rhetorician not obviously 
concerned with close readings, they find tremendous vitality 
in engagement with the literary tradition.
 Fundamentally, Horace and Longinus both set good 
reading as a logical prerequisite to good composition. Much 
of the craft, they equally maintain, cannot be taught – shown 
in Longinus’ notion of “great thoughts” (138) and Horace’s 
humorous  evasiveness regarding specific prescriptions. 
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Throughout their works, they default to literary legends with 
frequent allusion to Homer and the Greek dramatists; 
Longinus even devotes a significant portion to quoting and 
interpreting poetry: “Sappho’s excellence, as I have said, lies 
in her adoption and combination of the most striking 
details” (140). At the same time, Horace contends against 
inspiration from the Muse, emphasizing individual strivings: 
“Wisdom is the starting-point and source of correct writing. 
Socratic books  will be able to point out to you your material, 
and once the material is  provided the words will follow 
willingly enough” (129). The oxymoron “Socratic books”8 is 
microcosmic to Horace’s unique brand of tongue-in-cheek 
seriousness: the good poet really ought to read all the old 
masters, even Plato’s  repudiations of poetry itself. Indeed 
with sardonic solemnity, he beseeches, “Study Greek models 
day and night” (128). Glimmers of a cultural inferiority 
complex – a common Roman sentiment – seep into his 
Greek-Roman comparisons: 
Your ancestors  praised Plautus’ metre and his 
humour. On both counts their admiration was 
too indulgent, not to say childish, if it’s true that 
you and I know how to distinguish a witless jest 
from a subtle one and if we’ve skill in our 
fingers and ears to know what sounds  are 
permitted. (128)
Hidden beneath the jibe is his truth: the necessary skill of the 
good reader. Longinus is  more overtly inspired in his 
readings: “These great figures, presented to us as objects of 
emulation and, as it were, shining before our gaze, will 
somehow elevate our minds to the greatness of which we 
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8 Latin: Socraticae chartae, literally “Socratic paper” and equally absurd.
form a mental image” (143).
 Longinus’ statement is  significant particularly for his 
use of emulation, a term he delineates earlier: “Plato, if we 
will read him with attention, illustrates yet another road to 
sublimity, besides those we have discussed. This is the way of 
imitation (mimesis) and emulation (zelos) of great writers of 
the past” (142). Imitation is the copy spurned by Plato and 
embraced by Aristotle. Emulation is  an entirely different 
animal: zelos for Longinus and aemulatio for Horace; a 
zealous rewriting of vital cultural works; a literary 
appropriation with love. The conventional mimetic tradition 
involves the artful representation of real-life events 9 
accessible to a layperson audience. The emulator, far more 
esoterically, writes for other readers. Under this framework, it 
quickly becomes clear which Horace prefers: “My advice to 
the skilled imitator (imitatorem) will be to keep his  eye on the 
model of life and manners, and draw his speech living from 
there” (129). (How limiting!) With a clever reworking of the 
Odyssey’s opening lines as his device, Horace entreats: “The 
common stock will become your private property if you don’t 
linger on the broad and vulgar round, or anxiously render 
word for word, a loyal interpreter, or again, in the process of 
imitation, find yourself in a tight corner from which shame, or 
the rule of craft, won’t let you move” (125). Emulation, 
counterintuitively, liberates the writer. Longinus compares 
reading to the transcendent, supernatural of the Pythia at 
Delphi: 
Similarly, the genius of the ancients acts as  a 
kind of oracular cavern, and effluences flow 
from it into the minds of their imitators. Even 
those previously not much inclined to prophesy 
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9 Aristotle’s notion of verisimilitude.
become inspired and share the enthusiasm 
which comes from the greatness of others.
It is a righteous burden, to read the greats and attempt to write 
as greatly: “Truly it is a noble contest and prize of honour, 
and one well worth winning, in which to be defeated by one’s 
elders is itself no disgrace” (142). 
 In one of the Phaedrus’ ultimate rejections of written 
texts, Socrates declares: “They seem to talk to you as though 
they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what 
they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you 
just the same thing forever” (521). Plato’s argument rests 
upon the then-fundamental truth that a written work lacks the 
truth-seeking, engaging dynamism of the dialectic. He had no 
notion of the Greek and Latin textual tradition about to 
develop, leading scholars like Longinus to pose once 
unfathomable queries: “Even more stimulating is the further 
thought: ‘How will posterity take what I am writing?’” (143). 
To write sublimely, for Longinus, is to outlast a specific 
cultural milieu; for Horace, effective poetry which pleases 
and instructs is that which improves upon the most ubiquitous 
of extent works. Unlike the Platonists’ absolute truths, the 
learned pagans  recognized a dynamic tradition influenced by 
varying circumstances – not relativism exactly, but certainly 
something appreciable for modernists. Learning to compose 
meant, above all, reading the greats: for inspiration, 
opportunity, and challenge.
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